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COURT-ORDERED ADR:
WHAT ARE THE LIMITS?*
Nancy A. Welsh t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, courts across the country are turning to non-judicial dispute resolution processes - "alternative dispute resolution" or "ADR" to handle overwhelming caseloads.' Proponents of non-judicial processes
state that ADR benefits courts and litigants by reducing the time between
the filing and disposition of cases, saving judges' time so that they are available for the cases that really need them, saving money for the parties to the
suit, and perhaps most importantly, increasing litigants' satisfaction with
the manner in which their disputes are resolved.
A growing body of empirical evidence has begun to support the proponents' claims. A study of court-annexed arbitration showed greater liti2
gant satisfaction with the process and more rapid termination of cases.
* Copyright © 1991 HAMLINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW AND PoLIcv and © 1987, 1991
Nancy A. Welsh and Mediation Center.
t Executive Director of Mediation Center, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. In Florida, the circuit and county courts may refer any civil matter or a selected issue
to mediation or nonbinding arbitration. If the court orders the parties to use nonbinding
arbitration and a party files for a trial de novo, that party risks the assessment of arbitration
costs, court costs, and attorneys' fees if the judgment after the trial de nov0 is not more
favorable than the arbitration decision.
In the federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan, judges refer parties to a
"mediation" program which actually works like nonbinding arbitration. After referral, the
parties and their attorneys participate in a hearing before a three-attorney panel. The panel
provides its evaluation of the case to the parties. If the parties accept the evaluation, it is
entered as judgment in the case. If a party rejects the evaluation, the party risks sanctions if
the final verdict does not improve upon the panel's evaluation by at least 10%. (Recently, in
Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit held
that a federal district court did not have the authority to assess attorneys' fees as a sanction).
The federal district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky has adopted a local rule
which provides that a judge may set any civil case for summary jury trial or other alternative
method of dispute resolution.
In Hawaii state courts, all tort cases are assigned to an arbitration program. An arbitrator
holds a conference with counsel within 30 days from the date a case is assigned. The arbitrator oversees discovery requests and timelines (discovery is permitted only with the consent of
the arbitrator), attempts to aid in the settlement of the case if all parties consent in writing,
and if a case does not settle, conducts an arbitration hearing and issues an award. A party
who appeals an arbitration award risks sanctions if the final verdict does not improve upon the
arbitration award by at least 15%.
Pursuant to a Minnesota statute, Hennepin County District Court judges have the discretion to assign civil cases involving claims of more than $50,000 to mediation. MINN. STAT.
§ 484.74, subd. 1 (1990). The court also refers a variety of cases to a nonbinding arbitration
program.
2. Roberto, Note-Limits ofJudicialAuthority in PretrialSettlement Under Rule 16 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, 2 OHIO ST. J. Dis. REs. 311, 319 (1987) [hereinafter Roberto].
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Likewise, research in Hawaii and the Northern District of California has
demonstrated high litigant and attorney satisfaction with court-annexed
ADR programs. Most recently, the Office of the State Court Administrator
in Minnesota released a report which compared adjudication with courtannexed mediation and arbitration. Mediation and arbitration scored
higher than adjudication on every measure of client satisfaction.A
Yet, a nagging tension exists. On one hand are harriedjudges who see
"the promotion of informed and fair settlements [as] one of the most important aims of pretrial management" 4 and view ADR as a useful, beneficial, even necessary settlement tool. These judges are joined by state and
federal legislators who are concerned about the expense and delay which
are hampering the courts. 5 On the other hand are parties and attorneys
6
who have consciously chosen the traditional litigation process.
Should courts be permitted to "sidetrack" these parties and their attorneys from traditional litigation? Or is ADR, in the words of a Pennsylvania court, simply a "[n]ew device" which is part of contemporary
litigation, a device which must be used "to adapt the ancient institution of
[trial] to present needs" and to make litigation "an efficient instrument in
' 7
the administration of justice?
Guidance on these questions is strikingly sparse, particularly in light of
the courts' increasing experimentation with ADR. One commentator has
noted that the rules, statutes, and cases dealing with this issue "constitute
only a few 'dots' in a dot-to-dot line drawing which has yet to be completed."' 8 Of necessity, therefore, the analysis in this article will focus on
3. KOBBERVIG, MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY: AN EVALUATION (Feb.
1991) (52 page report produced by Office of Minnesota State Court Administrator).
4. Peckham, The FederalJudge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Casefrom Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 773 (1981).
5. Indeed, on December 1, 1990, President Bush signed the Judicial Improvement Act
into law. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(codified as amended in various sections of 5, 9, 11, 17, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). Title I of the Act
- the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990 - is called a "civil justice expense and delay reduction
plan" and provides that every U.S. district court must convene a local advisory group to tailor
such a plan for the district. Among the six "principles and guidelines" which must be considered in drawing up a plan is one which provides "authorization to refer appropriate cases to
alternative dispute resolution programs that - (A) have been designated for use in a district
court; or (B) the court may make available, including mediation, mini-trial, and summary jury
trial." 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6)(A-B) (1990).
6. They are joined by judges such as Judge Jack Weinstein who insists:
[I]f cases are growing in the federal courts, so be it! That is what judges and courts
are there to do: to hear cases. We are public servants pledged to do justice, not
exalted elites who bless the masses with such bites of judicial time as we deign to
dole out. If some judges are truly overburdened, then the first resort should be to
add judges or to add support staff, not to shut the courthouse door.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being
Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909-10 (1989).
7. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
8. Roberto, supra note 2, at 329.

COURT-ORDERED ADR
the few cases addressing courts' authority to order the use of ADR and will
describe the patterns that are beginning to emerge. Most of the cases involve court-ordered arbitration programs or orders to participate in summary jury trials. Challenges mounted against these processes have been
based primarily on the seventh amendment 9 guarantee of a right to a jury
trial and charges that courts have exceeded the authority granted under
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (a very small number of
challenges, not dealt with here, have been based on equal protection
claims and other rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Courts
have used various standards to test the extent and limits of their authority
but few limits on that authority have been revealed. With one notable exception, courts have strongly defended their right to order parties to use
ADR.
II.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES

Generally, those who have objected to court-ordered ADR have relied
heavily upon the seventh amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury
trial. This focus is logical, but it has not persuaded courts to rescind their
orders for the use of ADR. Why? The context is important. Most of the
seventh amendment objections have involved challenges to local federal
court rules.' 0 Judges have broad discretion in designing these local rules.
Indeed, the only substantial limitation upon their discretion is the requirement that local rules be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. "I
The Sixth Circuit has declared that a local rule establishing pretrial
procedures violates the seventh amendment if the rule permits a judge to
compel settlement prior to trial on terms which one or both of the parties
find completely unacceptable. 12 But ADR processes do not compel settle9. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
10. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 16 and 83, federal district courts have
adopted a wide variety of local rules which outline alternative methods of dispute resolution.
Some of these rules provide for the use of ADR in conjunction with traditional pretrial conferences (e.g., E.D. Cal., E.D. Penn., N.D. Cal., E.D. Mich.). Several courts' local rules establish
the use of non-binding arbitration (e.g., E.D. Cal., E.D. N.Y., E.D. Penn., N.D. Cal., E.D. Mich.
[referred to as "Michigan mediation"]). Other courts use mediation or summary jury trials
(e.g., N.D. Ohio, E.D. Ky.).
11. McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 1976). See Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641 (1987) (district courts have power to enact local rules necessary for courts to conduct
their business); G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc) (federal district court has inherent power to order a party represented by an attorney to personally attend a pretrial settlement conference and to impose sanction for failure to
comply with order); In re La Marre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir, 1974) (court found no
grounds for denying trial court the power to require parties' attendance at pretrial conference); Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 33 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (upheld striking defendant's pleadings
in medical malpractice case as an appropriate sanction for insurer's failure to send representative from home office to attend settlement conference as directed by court).

12. In re La Marre, 494 F.2d at 756.
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ment. They compel parties' and attorneys' participation in processes that are
aimed at facilitating settlement. Based on this distinction and three standards of analysis - the "ultimate access" standard, the "onerous condition" standard, and the "basic procedural innovation" standard - the
courts ultimately have defended court-ordered ADR against seventh
amendment challenges.
III.

ULTIMATE ACCESS

In response to seventh amendment charges against ADR processes,
some courts simply have conducted an analysis to determine whether the
litigants ultimately had access to a jury. The cost of the ADR process, the
time required for preparation, the impact of the process on future settlement discussions - none of these factors has been considered. If the litigants eventually had access to a jury, certain courts have been satisfied that
the right to a jury trial was not violated.
For example, in Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 13 a personal injury matter, the federal district court in the Eastern District of Michigan sent the
case to "mediation" (actually arbitration, as explained in the sidebar)
under a local rule. 14 The mediation panel awarded $100,000 to the plaintiff. The defendant rejected the award and demanded a jury trial; the
plaintiff accepted the award. Under the local rule, the defendant risked
liability for actual costs unless the verdict at trial was more than ten percent
below the evaluation. The trial was held before a jury and its award was
$228,000, more than twice the amount of the evaluation. The district court
awarded $5,400 in actual costs to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the local rule did not violate the
defendant's right to a jury trial. The court observed, "The Seventh
Amendment 'was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in
only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural
forms and details.' ",15 More particularly, the court found that "[a]t the
core of these fundamental elements is the right to have a ' "jury ultimately
determine the issues of fact if they cannot be settled by the parties or determined as a matter of law ....16
Finally, the court could not help but note that, despite the defendant's
claim that its constitutional rights had been violated, "[i]n keeping with the
Seventh Amendment's requirements," Massey-Ferguson had indeed had
17
the benefit of appearing before a jury and receiving the jury's award.
13. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 268.
15. Id. (quoting Galloway v. United States, 310 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
16. Id. (quoting Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoating Woods v. Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1979)).
17. Id. at 269.
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The federal district court in New England Merchants National Bank v.
Hughes, 18 performed a similar analysis as it upheld the constitutionality of a
local rule which provided for compulsory arbitration of certain claims. In
response to the defendant's objection to the rule, the court simply explained, "Local Rule 8 does not in any way abridge the constitutional right
of a litigant to trial by jury since the litigant is entitled to demand a trial de
novo provided he has complied with the procedures set forth in Local Rule
8. "19

IV.

ONEROUS CONDITION

Confronted with more substantive challenges, some courts have taken
an analytical step beyond the "ultimate access" standard to the "onerous
condition" standard, which explicitly balances the parties' right to a jury
trial against the benefits served by ADR and the degree to which ADR actually inhibits the ability of parties to exercise their seventh amendment
right. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court introduced the onerous condition
test in Smith's Case.20 There, a challenge based on the right to a jury trial
was brought against a local rule authorizing the compulsory arbitration of
all cases involving claims of less than $1,000. The rule also required payment of the arbitrator's fees as a precondition to an appeal from the arbitration award. In response to the challenge, the court stated: "All that is
required is that the right of appeal for the purpose of presenting the issue
to ajury must not be burdened by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or regulations which would make the right practically unavailable."2 1 The
Pennsylvania court then referenced several conditions which previously
had been found constitutional, including the requirement that parties provide security for the prosecution of an appeal and satisfaction of the final
judgment and the requirement that the parties pay a jury fee prior to commencement of trial. 22 Based on this analysis and precedent, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the local rule did not impose onerous
conditions and thus was constitutional. The court also emphasized that the
burdens imposed on parties by compulsory arbitration were far outweighed by the benefits of a speedy, less expensive, and more efficient trial
23
system.
However, the arbitration program did not escape totally unscathed.
Returning to the onerous condition test, the court examined the arbitrator's fees and noted:
18. 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
19. Id. at 714.
20. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub nom. Smith v. Wissler, 350 U.S.
858 (1958).
21. Id. at 231, 112 A.2d at 629 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 232, 112 A.2d at 630.
23. Id. at 231-32, 112 A.2d at 629-30.
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[T]he necessity of paying [$75 in arbitrators' fees] as a condition
for the right to appeal [from the arbitration award] would seemingly operate as a strong deterrent, amounting practically to a denial of that right [to a jury trial], if the case should involve only, as
in the present instance, as little as $250.24
Thus, courts generally required that the court rules provide for a
lower rate of compensation to arbitrators when only a comparatively small
25
claim was involved.
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again used the onerous condition standard to uphold the constitutionality of a statute establishing
compulsory arbitration in medical malpractice cases where health care
26
providers were defendants. In Parker v. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia,
the court emphasized that arbitration as a condition precedent approached
unconstitutional proportions only when substantial restrictions were
placed on the right to jury trial. Appellants contended that such onerous
restrictions existed. First, they argued that malpractice cases were so complex and expensive to try that the arbitration system effectively required
two trials and, thus, the system was unduly burdensome. 2 7 Appellants also
claimed that arbitration penalized appeals because the statute imposed all
costs of both the arbitration and trial (including expert witnesses' expenses) on the losing party if the appeal was found to be "capricious, frivo' 28
lous, and unreasonable.
The court rejected both of defendants' arguments, noting specifically
that there was no evidence that a second trial would be required. 2 9 The
court also incorporated into the analysis the state's interest in providing an
efficient alternative for dispute resolution and remarked:
Where the reason for the postponement of the right results from
the effort on the part of the state to achieve a compelling state
interest and the procedure is reasonably designed to effectuate
the desired objective, it cannot be said that there has been a constitutionally impermissible encroachment upon that right. The
24. Id. at 232, 112 A.2d at 630.
25. See Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co. v. McLeod, 39 Wash. App. 298, , 693 P.2d
161, 167 (1984) (upheld the constitutionality of arbitration process but noted "the costs or
fees imposed upon an appellant from a mandatory arbitration award as a precondition to
obtaining a jury trial must not be so large in proportion to the amount in controversy as to
constitute an unconstitutional restriction upon the right to a jury trial"); Opinion of the justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881, 887 (1973) (in an advisory opinion, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated that a required payment of arbitrators' fees of $750 or $1,125 to obtain
a jury trial on appeal from a mandatory arbitration award of a case involving $3,000 or less
would unconstitutionally infringe upon the jury trial right).
26. 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
27. Id. at 119, 394 A.2d at 939.
28. Id. at 120, 394 A.2d at 939.
29. Id. at 119, 394 A.2d at 939.
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acceptance in this jurisdiction of arbitration as a viable, expeditious, alternative method of dispute-resolution is no longer subject to question . . . . We are therefore satisfied that the
precondition of compulsory arbitration in cases of this type does
not present the type of 'onerous' restriction which we referred to
30
in Smith's Case.
The federal district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
31
adopted the state court's reasoning in 1979, in Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn.
In this case, which involved a personal injury claim, the defendants moved
to vacate an order referring the matter to an experimental compulsory arbitration program instituted by the Department of Justice.3 2 The district
court had adopted the program through its local rule 49. The program
provided that certain types of cases with money damages of $50,000 or less
would be referred automatically to arbitration. "Unless a party demanded
a trial de novo within 20 days after the entry of the award, the arbitration
panel's decision becomes a final, non appealable judgment."'s" The local
rule also imposed the amount of the arbitration fees upon the party who
demanded the trial de novo and failed to obtain a more favorable judgement, exclusive of interest and costs. The rule also imposed upon the defendant interest on the award from the time it was filed. Using arguments
very similar to those raised in Parker, the defendants claimed that the program created a burdensome, onerous condition upon their right to a jury
trial. 3 4 They asserted that because the arbitration limits were so high $50,000 - they had to conduct a full scale trial at the arbitration level to
protect the parties' interests and that, as a result, they would be required to
conduct two full trials. Like the court in Parker, the court rejected these
contentions and found that "arbitration is a useful tool to promote greater
efficiency in litigation and . . . pre-trial review in no way infringes upon
30. Id. at 120-21, 394 A.2d at 939-40 (citations omitted).

31. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
32. Id. at 567.
33. Id.
34. See Id. at 567-71. Defendants also argued that the Eastern District's local rule violated
the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution based on several claimed deficiencies.
First, the defendants noted that the pilot program inherently treated litigants in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania differently from those in other districts. Id. at 575. Second, they
observed that interest was required only of defendants who appeal from arbitration awards.
Id. Finally, the defendants argued that the classification of claims for arbitration based on
amount in controversy and subject matter jurisdiction were arbitrary, and bore no rational
relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 575-76. The Court responded to the
first challenge by finding that any disparity between districts was minimal. Id. at 575. The
court also found that an equal protection argument based on geographic differences ignored
the fact that "by their very nature," local rules would differ from district to district. Id. Finally, after analysis, the Court found the interest provision, the jurisdictional categories and
the subject matter categories rational and thus not violative of equal protection guarantees.

Id. at 577.
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constitutional rights of litigants."'3 5 Indeed, the court asserted that arbitration benefitted the parties by "forc[ing] counsel to focus their attention on
the basic elements of the case," eliminating "discovery which is of marginal
36
advantage at trial" and making "settlement ... a viable possibility."
V.

BASIC PROCEDURAL INNOVATION

Some courts have used a very different standard to respond to parties'
seventh amendment challenges-determining whether a non-judicial pretrial procedure represents a "procedural innovation" which is so basic that
it is actually "outcome-determinative." This standard focuses less on the
extent to which an ADR process impedes upon the parties' progress to trial
by jury and more on the ADR process's potential impact upon a jury's decision. The standard may be different, but the bottom line is the same.
Courts using the basic procedural innovation analysis have concluded that
court-ordered ADR processes do not violate the seventh amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court first established the "basic procedural innovation" standard in Miner v. Atlas.3 7 There, the Court invalidated a local
rule which authorized a court sitting in admiralty to order the taking of oral
depositions, declaring that oral depositions represented "basic procedural
innovations" which, "though concededly 'procedural' may be of as great
importance to litigants as many a 'substantive' doctrine." 3 8 The Court
clarified the definition of basic procedural innovations in 1973, in Colgrove
v. Battin,3 9 when it upheld the validity of a local rule establishing a jury of
six in a civil trial court because it found that a six-member jury was not a
basic procedural innovation. 40 The Court went on to explain that basic
procedural innovations:
are those aspects of the litigatory process which bear upon the
ultimate outcome of the litigation .

. .

. Since there has been

shown to be 'no discernable difference between the results
reached by the two different-sized juries' . . . a reduction in the

size of the civil jury from twelve to six plainly does not bear on the
41
ultimate outcome of the litigation.
This standard was first explicitly applied to non-judicial pre-trial procedures in Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn. 4 2 In addition to considering whether
pre-trial arbitration represented an onerous condition upon the right to a
jury trial, the court in Kimbrough examined the arbitration program to de35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 571.
Id.
363 U.S. 641 (1960).
Id. at 650.
413 U.S. 149 (1973).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164, n.23 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 (1970)).
478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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termine whether "there [was] a substantial likelihood that the outcome of the
trial would be influenced by the change [arbitration as a condition precedent
to trial]." '4 3 Because the arbitration award was non-binding and not admissible at trial, the court found no such influence on the outcome of the
final verdict and concluded that the local rule establishing the arbitration
44
program was not a basic procedural innovation.
Most recently, this standard was used by the court in McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc. ,45 in response to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the
court's order for another non-judicial pretrial procedure - the summary
jury trial. The court found that the summary jury trial, like non-binding
arbitration, was not "outcome-determinative," did not represent a basic
procedural innovation and, thus, did not violate the seventh amendment.
The court observed:
A summary jury trial is far less intrusive into the independence of
the trial lawyer or litigant than ...local rules [which provide for
the imposition of costs as a sanction for last-minute settlements
entered into after the jury has been brought in] upheld by the
above authorities. No presumption of correctness attaches to the
verdict of the summary jury, nor is any sanction imposed for failure to accept its advisory verdict. It is merely a useful settlement
device. It may require an expenditure of time and preparation but
so do pretrial orders, memoranda, conferences, marking of exhibits, etc. In no way is the summary jury trial 'outcome-determina46
tive' under the Supreme Court's Colgrove test.
Thus, whatever the standard used, courts have overcome seventh amendment challenges to ADR.
VI.

RULE

16

CHALLENGES

The other primary source of challenges to court-annexed ADR
processes has been Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. This rule was
drafted in 1938 and not revised until 1983. Significantly, the original rule
called for a pretrial conference of counsel with the court "to prepare for,
not avert, trial."'4 7 Pretrial conferences were not designed explicitly for
43. Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
44.

Id. at 573-74.

45. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
46. Id. at 46. See also Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D.
Fla. 1988) (finding the summary trial "a legitimate device" in providing litigants "with the
most expeditious and just case resolution."); Davison v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, 462
F.Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that a Maryland statute requiring that malpractice
claims against doctors and health care providers must be submitted to a three member arbitration panel does not violate the seventh amendment right to a jury trial) (The provision
"cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle ... takes no question of fact from either court or
it is merely a rule of evidence.").

jury. At most . ..

47. Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548 (2nd Cir. 1961).
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exploring or encouraging settlement. Instead, pretrial conferences were to
be used for simplifying and eliminating issues, amending pleadings where
necessary, avoiding unnecessary proof of facts and generally reducing opportunities for surprise at trial. Ultimately, the focus of the pretrial conference was on insuring the economical and efficient trial of every case on its
merits .48
As the caseload of the courts grew and as pursuit of settlement came
to be seen as a necessary and legitimate part of the judicial case management role, there were calls for the revision of Rule 16 to better encourage
pretrial management. In 1983, the Advisory Committee on Rules responded to those calls with the current Rule 16 which provides in pertinent
part:
RULE

16.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCES; SCHEDULING; MANAGEMENT

In any action, the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any
unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as ....
(A)

PRETRIAL CONFERENCES; OBJECTIVES.

(5) facilitating the settlement of the case ....
(c) SUBJECTS TO BE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL CONFERENCES. The
participants at any conference under this rule may consider and
take action with respect to ....
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute; ....
(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
49
action.
The 1983 amendments expanded the list of matters to be discussed at
the pretrial conference and specifically recognized "facilitating the settlement of the case" as an objective. 50 The Advisory Committee's Notes even
48. Roberto, supra note 2, at 312.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
50. Id. at (a)(5).
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make it clear that some conferences might focus solely on settlement. 5 '
In addition to recognizing settlement as an appropriate subject of a
pretrial conference, the 1983 amendments look outside the traditional litigation process for the resolution of disputes. Rule 16(c)(7) specifically references "extrajudicial procedures" to resolve disputes. Rule 16(c)(10)
authorizes the judicial use of special pretrial procedures to expedite complex cases. The Advisory Committee's Notes do not endorse any particular
52
pretrial techniques and instead highlight flexibility and experience.
Thus, Rule 16 clearly gives the courts the authority to move parties
toward settlement in pretrial procedures, and the courts have used Rule 16
as a basis for ordering pretrial ADR which focuses on settlement. However, Rule 16 simultaneously places some rather murky limitations on the
courts' authority. This murkiness is most evident in the following crucial
sentence from the Advisory Committee's Notes: "Although it is not the
purpose of Rule 16(c)( 7 ) to impose settlement negotiations on unwilling
litigants, it is believed that providing a neutral forum for discussing the
subject might foster it."' 5 3 When does court-ordered ADR "impose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants" and when does it "provid[e] a
neutral forum for discussing" settlement? 54 This language and its inherent tension have been partly responsible for widespread differences in
courts' pretrial practices and, recently, wildly contradictory case law.
In January, 1988, the Seventh Circuit handed down its opinion in
Strandell v. Jackson County.5 5 The case involved a civil rights action brought
by the parents of Michael Strandell against Jackson County, Illinois after
the arrest, strip search, imprisonment, and suicidal death of their son. 56 At
the first pretrial conference, the trial judge encouraged the parties to participate in a summary jury trial. The plaintiffs refused to consent to the
procedure, and the case was set for trial. 5 7 At a second pretrial conference
six months later, the court expressed its view that the anticipated five-to-six
week trial could not be accommodated easily on its crowded docket and
ordered the parties to participate in a summary jury trial. 58 On the day
chosen for the summary jury trial, the parties and their counsel appeared,
but the plaintiffs' attorney refused to proceed. The court held the attorney
in criminal contempt. Plaintiffs' attorney appealed, arguing that the court
51.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee notes.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is not much clearer when it provides that courts
may have the authority to "refer" cases to alternative dispute resolution. Does this mean
"order" parties into ADR? Or does it mean that courts have only the power to "suggest"
ADR?
55. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 884.
57. Id. at 884-85.
58. Id. at 885.
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lacked the power to compel a summary jury trial and maintaining that such
59
a proceeding violated his clients' rights.
The Seventh Circuit first observed that a district court has substantial
power to control and manage its docket. 60 However, the court also noted
that such power must be exercised in a manner that is in harmony with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which "strik[e] the delicate ... balance
between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual
litigant."' 6' The court then focused on Rule 16. The district court had
cited subsections (c)(7) and (c) (11) as authorizing a mandatory summary
jury trial. 6 2 The Seventh Circuit disagreed and referenced the Advisory
Committee's Notes, saying: "In our view, while the pretrial conference of
Rule 16 was intended to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial
procedures, it was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be
sidetracked from the normal course of litigation."' 63 In support of its position, the court found clarity in the murky passage described above. In particular, the court asserted: "While the drafters intended that the trial judge
'explor[e] the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute,' - including 'urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques
outside the courthouse,' they clearly did not intend to require the parties to
take part in such activities." 64 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that
Rule 16 did not give the trial court the authority to compel the parties' use
65
of the summary jury trial.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 886.
61. Id. at 886-87.
62. Id. at 887. For the district court's opinion seeStrandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D.
333 (S.D. Ill.1987).
63. Strandet, 838 F.2d at 887.
64. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee notes). Curiously, the court also quoted a Second Circuit decision which observed: "Rule 16 ... was not
designed as a means for clubbing the parties - or one of them - into an involuntary compromise." Id. (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)). The use of this quote
is curious because the opinion from the jury in a summary jury trial is purely advisory. Indeed, it does not appear that the trial court even planned to impose any sanctions like those
used in the mandatory arbitration programs described in the text.
65. Strandetl, 838 F.2d at 888. The court in Strandell also addressed the effect of a
mandatory summary jury trial on the rules regarding discovery and work-product privilege.
During discovery in this case, the plaintiffs had obtained statements from 21 witnesses. After
discovery closed, the defendants filed a motion to compel production of the witnesses' statements. The plaintiffs responded that the statements constituted privileged work-product, and
that the defendants could have obtained the information contained in the statements through
ordinary discovery. The district court denied defendants' motion to compel production, finding that defendants had failed to establish "substantial need" and "undue hardship." Id.
Based on these facts, the Seventh Circuit found that the disclosure of information required in
a summary jury trial could "affect seriously" the rules regarding discovery and work-product
privilege by upsetting the "carefully-crafted balance between the needs for pretrial disclosure
and party confidentiality." Id. See also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720
F. Supp. 1433, 1437 (D. Colo. 1988) (although the court upheld its authority to require parties and their attorneys to discuss settlement in 20 remaining cases, the court also noted that a
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District courts' reactions to the Seventh Circuit's ruling were swift and
negative. The opinions in Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone,66 and McKay
v. Ashland Oil, Inc. ,67 were issued three months after Strandell. In Arabian
American Oil Co., two of the defendants moved the court to excuse their
participation in a court-ordered summary jury trial, alleging that there was
no possibility of settlement in the case and that they wished to avoid the
expenditure of time and money that the summary jury trial would require. 68 The court discussed Strandell and found it to be neither persuasive
nor binding precedent. 6 9 Instead, the court examined Rule 16 and found
the intent to be quite different from that divined by the Seventh Circuit:
[Rule 16] gives the court the power to direct parties to appear
before it for various purposes, including expediting the disposition of the action; facilitating the settlement of the case; and taking action in regard to matters which may aid in the disposition of
the action. Rule 16 calls these procedures conferences, but what
is in a name. The obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16 is to allow
courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and
effective case management and disposition. Whatever name the
judge may give to these proceedings their purposes are the same
and are sanctioned by Rule 16.70
Ultimately, the court denied defendants' motions to the extent that they
were based upon a suggestion that the court did not have the authority to
71
require the parties' participation in summary jury trials.
In McKay, the court first found mandatory use of the summary jury
trial valid under the "basic procedural innovation" standard and then went
'72
on to respond to Strandell "in a spirit of furthering constructive debate."
The court began by directly contradicting the Seventh Circuit:
In the view of this court, a trial court's requiring participation in a
summary jury trial is all but expressly authorized by these provisions
of Rule 16 [subsections (a)(5), (c)(7), (c)(10) and (c)(11)] ....
Plainly Rule 16 would authorize the trial judge to hold a final pretrial conference in the form of a condensed trial. In a summary
jury trial, the court just has laymen sit in and give their
73
reactions.
case management device can represent an abuse of discretion if "the device chosen requires
parties to disclose particular strategies or evidence which would prejudice their presentations
at trial.").
66. 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
67. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
68. 119 F.R.D. at 448.
69. Id. at 449.
70. Id. at 448.
71. Id. at 449.
72. 120 F.R.D. at 46.
73. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).

48

HAMLINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LA W AND POLICY

[Vol. 12

Moreover, the court pointedly observed that the Judicial Conference of the
United States "has passed a formal resolution endorsing the experimental
use of summary jury trials."' 7 4 In that resolution, the Conference "purposely . . . deleted" language limiting the experiment to voluntary summary jury trials. 75 Thus, the court concluded, "[t]he belief of the Judicial
Conference that mandatory summary jury trials were authorized by the
'76
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seems apparent."
In Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada,7 7 which was decided several months later in 1988, Magistrate Janice Symchych analyzed
the rationales of Strandell, Arabian American Oil, and McKay. Federal Reserve
Bank was an asbestos products liability case which was expected to require
four to six weeks of court time. 78 Symchych had ordered the parties to
participate in a three-day summary jury trial followed by a settlement conference. 79 All of the parties requested to be excused from participation in
the summary jury trial, arguing that the process would be too expensive
and would not accurately reflect a jury trial because several major evidentiary rulings had not yet been made by the trial judge.8 0 In addition, they
81
insisted that the possibility of settlement was extremely remote.
Symchych first observed the need for active settlement activity by the court:
Parties and attorneys are often and understandably reluctant to
accept and participate in procedures outside the traditional norm.
It is often difficult to focus the attention of counsel and litigants
on settlement as an alternative means of resolving a case. The
74. Id. For text of the resolution see Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 335
(S.D. I1. 1987). McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48 n.16.

75. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48.
76. Id. The court also addressed the Seventh Circuit's finding that the mandatory summary jury trial violated privilege and protection of work product, saying:
The concern of the Seventh Circuit . . . seems misplaced. Modern federal courts
require a comprehensive pre-trial order, exchange of witness lists and summaries of
anticipated testimony, and the listing and marking of all exhibits. Because a summary jury trial is based on facts disclosed by discovery and is to be a synopsis of the
actual trial, it is hard to see how anything would be disclosed by a summary jury trial
that would not be disclosed at the real trial and would not already be contained in
the pretrial order, which is also an overview of the real trial. If the Seventh Circuit
means that a summary jury trial prevents a litigant from saving some juicy tidbit as a
surprise for the trial a la Perry Mason, the pretrial orders used by most courts are
supposed to do the same thing. Trial by ambush has long since been eliminated
from the federal system.

Id. See also, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D.
Minn. 1988) ("If the Seventh Circuit implication is that a SJT [summary jury trial] prevents
the litigant from saving some surprise for the trial, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
designed to avoid that eventuality. Trial by ambush is no longer an accepted method of
practice.")
77. 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988).
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id. at 603.
80. Id. at 604.
81.

Id.
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need to compel the parties to address settlement, is an integral
aspect of the docket management function of the court in this era
82
of complex, protracted litigation.
Symchych noted that she rejected the view of the Seventh Circuit and accepted the rationale of Arabian American Oil and McKay as a "better approach." 8 3 Further, like the courts in Arabian American Oil and McKay,
Symchych found outright support for the courts' use of mandatory summary jury trials in Rule 16:
The Advisory Committee Notes articulate that the obvious goal
of the amendments [to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] was
the promotion of case management of which settlement is a valuable tool. Therefore, it is difficult to reconcile the argument that
Rule 16 does not permit courts to order the parties to participate
in summary jury trials with the goals of that rule. It is hard to
imagine that the drafters of the 1983 amendments actually intended to strengthen courts' ability to manage their caseloads
while at the same time intended to deny the court the power to
84
compel participation by the parties to the litigation.
Regarding the parties' specific objections, Symchych observed that "in a
case such as this, it is reasonable to require the parties to engage in settlement efforts with some degree of intensity ....

[A]n investment of three

days for the SJT [summary jury trial] when compared to a potential real
jury trial lasting four-to-six courtroom weeks is reasonably proportionate." 8 5 She also asserted that "this court can decide crucial evidentiary
issues for the purpose of the SJT proceeding." 8 6 Finally, based on the applicable case law, rules and responses to the parties' objections, Symchych
denied the parties' request to be excused from participation in the sum87
mary jury trial.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The final word on the courts' authority to order the use of ADR as part
of their pretrial practice definitely is not established. However, a pattern
seems to be emerging. Most significantly, the courts generally have tended
to defend their right to require parties to participate in non-binding
processes - mediation, non-binding arbitration, summary jury trial - in
order to encourage settlement. Whether they use the "ultimate access"
standard, the "onerous condition" standard or the "basic procedural inno82. Id.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 606.
Id. at 607 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 608.
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vation" standard, the courts have unanimously protected court-ordered
ADR against the chrge that it deprives litigants of their seventh amendment rights. Similarly, with the exception of the Seventh Circuit, the
courts have found that Rule 16 gives them the authority to require litigants' participation in processes designed to encourage settlement.
However, there are a few anomalies in the pattern which may represent slight or potential limitations upon courts' authority to order the use
of ADR. Penalty provisions and fees may be found unconstitutional if they
appear too large in relation to the amount in controversy in a case. In
addition, the language of Rule 16 is ambiguous enough that courts grappling with this issue in the future could divine a limitation upon the extent
to which they may require parties to focus on settlement. We will have to
wait and see whether these limitations become more prominent and
whether other patterns develop in the future.

